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one test, whether clinical or laboratory, suffices" (p. 94). And that medical
judgment is best made usually by the patient's attending physician.
The book's second half (ch. 7 and on) concerns ethics itself, its foundations
and presuppositions. O'Reilly argues well that bioethics is not a normative science.
So where derive its norms? He does not hold for a valid rational ethics apart from
the integral vision of man provided by God's Revelation. He critiques (ch. 8) false
humanism and faulty ethical systems quite thoroughly. And in outlining true
humanism and Christian ethics (ch. 9) he provides an especially clear explanation
of the classic "sources of morality" (object-circumstances-end, pp. 129-134) in a
chapter that amounts to a blitz review of fundamental moral theology.
The final chapter (10) reviews the authority of the Church in ethics and ethical
decisions, particularly authoritative moral teaching post-Vatican II and postHumanae Vitae. In fact, the argument h ere is more ecclesiological than ethical,
but that only fits the post-Vatican II, post-Humanae Vitae facts which controversies have been more about the nature of the Church and h er teaching than
abou t the pros and cons of specific moral questions.
In summation, O'Reilly succeeds in his first stated purpose - to present the
nature of modern science, its method, achievements and limitations. He does this
in clearly written, logically coherent and very informative accounts of mode rn
physics and biology .
On ethical theory and its presuppositions, he stresses an objective moral order,
ultimately dependent on God, that man can come to know. Given human fallibility, God has given Revelation and the Church as the certain guide for living
rightly. In moving from that objective moral order (open to reason) to the need
for authoritative Revelation , some Catholic ethicists and moralists might think
O'Reilly moves too quickly.
Followers of von Hildebrand will easily follow with O'Reilly, but other
Thomists (especially recent ones) will like to see a larger role for "right reason"
grounded in St. Thomas's natural law theory.
The book is instructive and it does inform the reader both in scientific information and ethical theory. As at the start, the big questions of "life and death " are
treated superbly, as are the nature of modern science, its method and limitations.
Several current "hot items" in bioethics are not treated directly, but such specifics
can only be considered intelligently when the big basic presuppositions have been
defined, delineated and digested. This volume does that first work well.
- Rev. William B. Smith, S.T.D.
Professor of Moral Theology
St. Joseph's Seminary
Dunwoodie

Infanticide and the Value of Life
Marvin Kohl, Editor
Prom etheus Books, Buffalo, N. Y, 1978.
As an example of the kinds of arguments offered by thos e who favor infanticide for some defect ive newborns, this book is a very useful compendium. It also
ought to be very useful to those who deplore infanticide , for in general, the essays
are notable only [or their lapses in argument, th eir evasion o[ central issues and
their vague and inapp licable cr iteria for deciding which infants shall die . The 17
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essays are mostly new and represent a spectrum of specialties including religion,
medicine, philosophy and the social sciences. While the topics covered center on
the moral questions involved, there are papers on the legal issues, on the psychological and an thropological dimensions of the problem, and statements of the
Jewish and Christian theological positions involved (Immanual Jakobovitz on the
J ewish position and John Donnelly on the Christian view of suffering). There is
also a brief annotated bibliography and an appendix in which law professor Arval
Morris offers a proposed infanticide law.
The general position taken by most of the authors may be gauged from a section of Morris's proposed law. In describing which children are "qualified " (a
revealing term) for euthanasia under the proposed law , he writes:
Irremedial condition means either (a) a serious physical illness, including
serious genetic defects, serious birth defects, or other physical impairment
which is diagnosed as severe and incurable and which is expected to cause a
child severe distress or pain and to render him incapable of the rational or
functional existence needed to enjoy the most minimal amount of human
goods necessary to constitute human life in its most minimal sense, or (b) a
condition of brain or genetic damage or deterioration such that what would
be a child's normal mental or genetic faculties are so severely or irreparably
impaired to such an extent that the child has been rendered incapable of
leading a rational existence.
This simply will not do. The crucial phrases about "rational or functional existence" are never defined , either here or in Morris's longer paper. What they might
mean in practice is left to arbitrary guesswork or probably sheer prejudice against
the retarded. Unfortunately this is representative of far too many of the essays in
the book. We are constantly told of individuals who are "incapable of a rational
existence," of those with a "meaningless existence," of "vegetables," or of lives
that are "bad on the whole. " The vagueness of such concepts is obvious. Their
uselessness as guides to practice is even more apparent. Yet, they continue to
appear throughout the essays with a relentlessness as astonishing as it is deplorable. Finally Anthony Shaw comes clean on the issue: there is no such standard
on which we can find agreement, yet we still must go on doing what is done
today - infanticide in selected cases - for reasons that are never given. This is
about as persuasive as a proposal to continue with racial prejudice.
These are intelligent authors, mainly philosophers, whose discipline has generally prided itself as being a bastion of conceptual rigor and analytic precision.
But the conceptual apparatus above is hopelessly vague and weak. Consider, for
example, Marvin Kohl's argument in which he claims that: "A span of life
becomes devoid of meaning roughly when, or to the extent to which, an individual
cannot possess goals or when, if he can and does have goals, he believes they are
trivial or impossible to achieve." As a matter of policy this definition of the
"meaningless life" is unacceptable. If he means to claim that any goal, no matter
how small, is adequate to give life meaning, then there will be virtually no infants
in the "meani ngless life" category. Even the most severely defective children can
pursue certain aims, especially under the guidance of wise therapists and/or
parents.
If on the other hand he means either a) that one must consciously possess goals
one knows one has, or b) that the goals must not be as minimal as implied above,
then he has offered us a very disturbing and morally offensive description of the
lives of hundreds of thousands of profoundly and severely retarded persons.
Kohl's point, however, is obvious : ending meaningless lives is a morally right act.
But on the further question, "Are we obligated to do this?" he hedges, undoubtedly aware that he is on the edge of a genocide program. The hedge is in-effective.
He claims that while one may abhor something, e.g., ugliness, one is not thereby
free to destroy all ugly things. Why not? Presumably either because they have
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some other valuable qualities or because someone else subjectively values them.
The latter alternative would rule out all infanticide and Kohl cannot be supposed
to have inte nded this result. We are left, therefore , with the former alternative.
Unfortunately, this is not muc h h elp either. In order to rule out genocide we
would nee d to know what these overriding qualiti es are and why so me infants
have them and others don't. These are questions that Kohl steadfastly refuses to
a nswer. In fact, I think that it wo uld be very difficult for him to do so . He has
already maintaine d that these "individuals" have completely "meaningless" lives
and that ending such lives is a morally right act (at least prima facie) . If a person
really does have such a life, would it not be a paradigm of cruelty to inflict continued ex istence on him? I fail to see any reason not to conclude that except in a
very few cases (which rem ain unspecified anyway), all of these lives ought to be
ended. The fact is that Kohl has given a case for th e mass elimination of tens of
thousands of infants and c hildren and he has not succeeded in separating himself
from the logic of his argum ent.
Richard Brandt 's essay is not better than Kohl's. He contents himself with
asserting that we might establish a happiness curve for individuals centered around
an "i ndifference axis." Th e curve would go above the axis for a mom ent of happiness and below it for a mom ent of unhappiness. On this basis h e believes we could
decide when some lives are " ba d on the whole." For such infants killing them is
morally acceptable. T ypically , h e never gives us any clear idea of how we could
decide where to plac e any given moment on the curve. Even without such criteria,
the proposal is contradictory on its face.
Brandt argues that th e neon ate does not have any wants, d esires or ex p eri e nces
that are the basis for the co ncept of consent. He cannot care about life since he
knows nothing of it. Grant this and the judgment of hi s "happiness curve"
becom es the worst exa mpl e of arbitrary paternalism. We decide not that he will
think his life bad (we h ave no way of knowing what he will think) but rath er, that
we believe his life will be bad. Why? Simply because we would not want it ourse lves? I cannot see any other alternative on Bl·andt's own grounds. For example ,
he writes: "There are also so m e positive enjoy m ents: of eating, drinking, elimination , seeing the nurse coming with food and so on. But the brief enjoy m ents can
hardly b alance t he long stretc hes of boredom, discomfort or even pain. On t h e
whole, t he lives of suc h children are bad according to the happiness criterion ."
Severely abnormal children are hard ly ever in pain for lon g periods so as a description of those he wishes to kill, this will not do. Di sco mfOl·t and bore dom are no
better. Brandt sure ly finds bore dom unpl easant and believes that the li fe of the
defective child will be boring for long periods. Boring for Brandt - yes . Boring for
the child - probably not. At th e very least, o n Brandt's own gro unds we have no
way to say whether the infant's life will b e boring a nd to assert t h at it only
be tray s a prejudice against seve rely d efective infants and childre n. In t h e end
Brandt gives us li ttle more than a vic io us circle in which to find the missing
answers in hi s paper. Th e lives in question are bad becau se h e beli eves th ey a re
bad , a simple a nd totally unconvincing c lai m.
These essays are unfortunately representative of the positions taken by many
of t h ose in t h e book. They all speak in large and abstract terms with no attention
to precise criteria or to t h e logical app li cation of what t h ey do say to cl in ical practice. But the logi c of what we are told is clear: t here wou ld be nothing wrong with
the mass e limin at ion of sevel·al hundred thousand profoundly or severe ly reta rd ed
persons.

This criticism is not tru e of some of t h e p apers. A few re main at t h e level of
purely theoretical questions, so m e are largely descriptive, and sti ll oth ers dispute
the permissibility of infa nti c id e. In t h e first category Steph en Nath anso n offers an
intriguing paper, "Nihili sm, Reason and th e Value of Life, " which is more an
essay on nihili sm than an ythin g else. It is interesting bu t somewhat unrelated to
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the more practical concerns of the book. In the second category are papers on the
psychology of infanticide and an anthropological survey of the question in other
cultures. In the third category, five papers may be said to dispute the ethics on
infanticide but only one of these really goes to the heart of the matter in a philosophically acceptable manner. The essays of Jakobovitz and Donnelly really discuss the views of the Jewish and Christian traditions respectively and so will be
unacceptable to those who do not share their religious premises. Leonard Weber
makes a case for keeping the law the way it is on these matters , but the theoretical
side of his essay is rather weak and undeveloped. Karen Meltzer's essay is important symbolically but is not in itself the rigorous work needed to defend her position. She is a young woman who was born with spina bifida and other problems.
Having undergone numerous operations, she has since graduated magna cum laude
from college and now works as a health care consultant.
Kluge's paper is the only critical piece that really develops a philosophically
adequate position. Straightforwardly, he contends that infanticide is murder and
ought to be treated as such, independently of the supposed quality of li fe of the
infant. This conclusion , however, is marred by his seeming willingness to countenance some instances of infanticide, without again giving us any clear idea of which
cases these might be.
Yet this question, which most authors simply don't handle and others handle
badly , is crucial from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint. Its practical
importance is obvious, but except for writers like Joseph Fletcher who disdain
moral rules, its theoretical importance ought to be obvious as well. As Brand t himself has previously argued, we must evaluate moral rules in terms of their consistency and their capability to generate acceptable conclusions if they are generalized to all similar cases. Hence, the only proper way to evaluate proposals for
infanticide would be to see where they would lead to if generalized. Few of the
authors in this book, however, even try to answer this query. Those who do ,
present us with proposals that would, if generalized, lead to the mass elimination
of severely retarded persons. If this is not an unacceptable conclusion to a moral
policy proposal, then I simply do not know what such an unacceptable proposal
would be.
- Richard Sherlock
University of Tennessee
Center for the Health Sciences

Whatever Happened to the Human Race?
Francis A. Schaeffer and C. Everett Koop, M.D.
Fleming H. Revell Co., Old Tappan, N. J. , 1979,256 pp.
Whatever Happened to the Human Race 2 is not a profound book , but it is
interesting on several counts. Francis Schaeffel· is an evangelical Protestant author
who has formed a Christian community in L ' Abri, Switzerland and gathered an
appreciable worldwide following. He is not a particularly deep or innovative
thinker, but he is capable of popularizing the thought of others. Schaeffer has
teamed up with a pediatric surgeon , C. Everett Koop, to produce a popular po lemic
against the growing practices of abortion, infanticide and euthanasia.
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